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Introduction 
As we approach the upcoming election year, presidential hopefuls are 
rapidly emerging. As the candidates address the issues, they have already 
begun to assess the achievements of the current administration. It is 
therefore appropriate to present a progress report and evaluate the changes 
made by the Reagan Administration since there is considerable time until 
1985 to offer some suggestions for the future. 
So far, the third year of the Reagan Administration has not exactly been 
a high water mark in the movement to reform federal regulation of 
business. The Environmental Protection Agency has just begun to emerge 
from an unparalleled assault. Both the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
have seen some of their key initiatives overturned in the courts. The tempo 
of deregulation of surface transportation has wound down. Protectionism 
is on the rise, and industrial policy is no longer an obscene term in the 
business community. 
In issuing this report card, I have assigned expectations to key aspects of 
regulatory reform which needed to be addressed when this administration 
took office. To clear the air at the outset, I do not equate regulatory 
reform with minimizing the costs of complying with regulation. Nor do I 
view the task as maximizing the burden of regulation or attempting to use 
the regulatory process to punish business for its various sins of commission 
or omission. Rather, I view reform in terms of optimization, of moving to 
a more efficient regime of regulatory activity. Adopting a less burdensome 
method of achieving regulatory goals is a way of enhancing support for 
this type of governmental activity. Regulatory reform can help lead us to a 
more productive economy, one whose industries are more competitive in 
world markets, and one which delivers a better living standard to its 
citizens. 
Expectations and Evaluation Procedure 
To evaluate the progress and changes made during the past few years, we 
need to define the original expectations for regulatory reform so that we 
have a base for comparison. To do this, I would like to refer to the Report 
of the Task Force on Regulatory Reform which I submitted as chairman to 
President-elect Ronald Reagan shortly after the 1980 presidential election. 
A public (sanitized) version of that report was published in the 
November /December issue of Regulation. 1 
Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at 
Washington University in St. Louis. He is a former Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers. This report is reprinted with permission from California Management Review, 
Fall1983 (350 Barrows Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720). 
In it we urged a ''new approach'' to government regulation that pursues 
two objectives simultaneously: doing a better job of achieving regulatory 
goals while reducing regulatory burdens. We provided some specific 
guidance to the new administration. The variety of regulatory activities 
requires a varied approach to regulatory reform. In the case of economic 
regulation, we proposed dismantling of controls to enhance consumer 
Regulatory reform can help lead us to a more productive 
economy, one whose industries are more competitive 
in world markets 
welfare. In the case of social regulation, we urged seeking out the most 
effective and least burdensome methods of achieving the desired objec-
tives. For some regulatory programs, such as efforts to reduce product 
hazards, we suggested that, rather than government standards, the provi-
sion of better information enables consumers themselves to make more 
sensible trade-offs between safety and price. 
We stated that the selection of new appointees to regulatory agencies 
requires great care. We specifically urged that they be "people who are 
sympathetic with the important social objectives to be achieved." As we 
also noted, the fundamental p.;·oblems of government regulation result 
more from statutory shortcomings than from deficiencies on the part of 
executive branch agencies. Citing an urgent need to change the fundamen-
tal regulatory statutes, we also proposed a one-year moratorium on new 
regulations. Such action would provide a breathing spell in which to adjust 
to the rapid proliferation of regulatory rules and programs which were 
promulgated in recent years. 
In addition, we advocated the imposition of a cost-benefit test requiring 
each agency to demonstrate, before a new rule is issued, that at least a 
reasonable relationship exists between the costs imposed and the benefits 
produced. In terms of organizations, we recommended that the President 
abolish the Regulatory Council, which we described as a protective associa-
tion for the regulators, who constituted its entire membership. We urged 
establishing a new White House office to spearhead the regulatory 
reform effort. 
In the words of our public article in Regulation, ''these proposals ... do 
not constitute a Neanderthal plea to ignore the real problems of pollution, 
discrimination, and so on. Precisely to the contrary, they are offered in the 
belief that every task government undertakes should be performed 
ably ... !' 2 
The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which these 
bright and bold expectations have been met since the Reagan Administra-
tion took office. Because most of the factors involved are not subject to 
2 
u[Reform] proposals . .. do not constitute a Neanderthal plea 
to ignore the real problems of pollution, discrimination, 
and so on . ... They are offered in the belief that every 
task government undertakes should be performed ably." 
measurement, the findings of necessity will primarily be subjective, and at 
times impressionistic. This examination will assess the administration's 
performance in terms of four assignments: 
• the key organizational reforms affecting regulatory policies and 
practices; 
• statutory reforms to reduce the burden or improve the effectiveness of 
regulation; 
• procedural reforms affecting the issuance of regulation; 
• reducing the burdens of federal regulation of private economic 
activity. 
Assignment One: Organizational Reform 
Early in the Reagan Administration, important organizational changes 
were made in order to better coordinate and direct regulatory policy. To 
demonstrate clearly the importance of regulatory reform, the President 
appointed the Vice President to head up a cabinet-level Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief. The Task Force was given the assignment of providing 
leadership to the Administration's regulatory efforts and to serve, in 
effect, as a court of appeals for controversies which would emerge from 
the day-to-day review of proposed regulations by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. 
The President quickly abolished the Regulatory Council, the Council on 
Wage and Price Stability (and moved its regulatory review staff to OMB), 
and did not activate the Regulatory Analysis Review Group, which was so 
prominent in the previous administration. In their stead, he directed OMB 
to set up a detailed regulatory review function. In order to assure close 
coordination, the OMB official in charge of regulatory activities was also 
designated to serve as the Executive Director of the Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief. Executive Order 12291, signed by the President in 
February 1981, has governed the regulatory relief effort of the Administra-
tion since then. 
The various organizational changes provide, in effect, for a three-
layered review of proposed rulemaking. The first level (or set of levels) is in 
the agency or department conducting the regulatory activity. The agencies 
are responsible for conducting the basic regulatory review required by 
Executive Order 12291 (to be described below). OMB conducts the second 
level of review, focusing on the required analysis of benefits and costs. The 
final review point - unless the matter is appealed to the President - is the 
Vice President's Task Force. Clearly, the formal structure of regulatory 
review provides several key check points to ensure the consistency of 
regulatory activities with the Administration's regulatory policies-
subject, as always, to legislative restraints and individual discretion. 
Evaluation- I give the Administration high marks for acting quickly 
and decisively in setting up an effective mechanism to spearhead and 
conduct regulatory reform on a continuing basis. Obviously, this 
evaluation represents less than total objectivity, to the extent that my 
advice was taken. 
Assignment Two: Statutory Reform 
With reference to changes in regulatory statutes since January 1981, I 
must report that the results have been disappointingly few. The flagship of 
environmental regulation, the Clean Air Act, contains a timetable that 
provides for renewal, and hence review, in 1981. To some extent, the 
Administration was reluctant to propose substantial change for fear that 
Congress would be unsympathetic. Although there was substance to that 
concern, the fact of the matter is that the Administration proved to be 
extraordinarily timid. 
Acting after the matter had been reviewed with the President in the 
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environment, the EPA sent to 
Congress some general guidelines for reviewing the Act, instead of pro-
posing the specific language changes that were anticipated. Even the 
guidelines were diluted-not containing, for example, the benefit/cost or 
cost-effectiveness requirement that was championed during the 1980 
election campaign. The EPA director contended that, given the expected 
difficulty of obtaining Congressional approval for significant statutory 
change, it would be wiser to rely on her ability to modify enforcement 
procedures. The rest is history, unfortunately. 
Deregulation of 'Iransportation-In 1982, several specialized but 
positive statutory changes were enacted to advance the cause of regulatory 
reform.3 Following the pattern of earlier Congresses in deregulating the 
airline industry and reducing the scope of regulation in trucking and 
railroads, the 97th Congress passed a statute substantially reducing regula-
tion in the passenger bus industry. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 
(P .L. 97-861) eased conditions for market entry and preempted many state 
regulations that have restricted interstate bus operation. 
4 
The 1982 law authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to issue a 
certificate for regular-route transportation if the applicant is merely "fit, 
willing, and able to provide'' the service. Fitness only means adequate 
insurance and safety provisions. The sole criterion for denying a certificate 
is a finding by the ICC that the authorization would not be consistent 
with the public interest. The burden of proof is on those objecting to 
issuing the certificate. 
Many of the previous obstacles to entry are knocked down. Thus, the 
public interest test may not be used to reject an applicant if the service is 
for a community not regularly served by passenger bus service, if the pro-
posed service replaces discontinued air or rail transportation, or if the 
motor carrier serving the community has filed to decrease or discontinue 
service. 
Some operating restrictions are also removed. The 1982law allows 
carriers on interstate routes to serve intermediate points if this does not 
conflict with commuter bus operations. It permits, but does not require, 
round-trip operations where previously only one-way trips had been 
authorized. It also authorizes carriers to transport charter passengers and 
regular passengers intrastate in the same vehicle. 
The Bus Reform Act also establishes a zone of rate freedom within 
which fares may be raised or lowered without ICC approval. The size of 
the rate zone will be allowed to increase gradually; prices will be totally 
deregulated in 1985 except for rates set collectively through rate bureaus. 
The ICC still can suspend "predatory" special or charter rate proposals. 
Thus, bus regulation continues, but the reduction in the intensity of regula-
tion surely represents progress in advancing the cause of deregulation. 
For a while, it seemed that some backsliding might be occurring from the 
progress made in prior administrations in reducing the extent of railroad 
regulation. But the appointment of several reform-minded commissioners 
to the ICC has helped. Some modest evidence is available on that score. 
For example, the number of contracts negotiated between rail carriers and 
shippers - a measure of the operating flexibility granted by the Staggers 
Rail Act of 1980- increased from 580 in fiscal year 1980 to 2,907 in fiscal 
1982. In terms of output, railroads have increased their share of total 
freight traffic. They also have substantially increased their shipments of 
some commodities, such as fruits and vegetables, that previously were 
carried almost exclusively by trucks~ The next round of appointments to 
the commission will be a key to determining the future thrust of deregula-
tion of surface transportation. 
Deregulation of Financial Institutions- In the area of regulation of 
financial institutions, the Congress took the initiative and passed the Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. This new law contains a 
5 
wide variety of new and expanded powers for banks and other depository 
institutions. The Act directs the Deposit Institutions Deregulatory Com-
mittee (DIDC) to establish a deposit account for financial institutions 
"directly equivalent to and competitive with money market and mutual 
funds." The new accounts carry no maximum interest rate and modest 
minimum balance requirements. The changes have had virtually instan-
taneous effects. Since DIDC has authorized the new type of account, the 
shift of deposits from money market mutual funds to commercial banks 
and savings institutions has been massive. Surely, the new law enables 
depository institutions to compete head on with money market mutual 
funds. 
The 1982law also accelerates the elimination of the interest rate dif-
ferential allowed thrift institutions, thus helping to achieve the "level play-
ing field" that commercial banks have been advocating. For a three-year 
period, the Garn-St. Germain Act authorizes interstate acquisitions of 
troubled financial institutions, including banks with assets of $500 million 
or more. The merger of Seafirst into the Bank of America is the most 
dramatic example of the power of this new provision. 
The degree of competition among financial institutions is far greater 
today than it was two or three years ago. Some of that change results from 
legislation passed in 1980 and prior years. The pace of change also results 
from technological advances and institutional innovation. But the 
enhanced scope of marketplace competition is occurring in a political and 
economic climate that is more conducive and encouraging than in the past. 
Evaluation-Those of us who are enthusiasts for regulatory reform 
must look back with disappointment at the modest statutory changes that 
have been made since January 1981. It is fashionable, of course, to 
bemoan the lack of leadership on this score in either the Executive or 
Legislative Branches. Although I am not inclined to let either end of 
Pennsylvania Avenue off the hook, the basic problem is much deeper. It is 
the fact that, in many instances, the necessary foundation has not been laid 
in terms of public understanding and support for reducing the burdens of 
regulation. 
Just try to change a comma in the Clean Air Act, 
and you lay yourself open to charges that you want 
to "gut" environmental protection 
Unfortunately, it is a commonplace but true observation that the media 
are generally unhelpful or at least extremely naive in the regulatory area. 
Just try to change a comma in the Clean Air Act, and you lay yourself 
open to charges that you want to "gut" environmental protection, that 
6 
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you are a green-eyeshade type who does not care about ecology. Perhaps 
some modern-day Shakespeare can write the script whereby a reform-
minded economist declares, "If I am polluted, do I not cough?" 
The sad fact is that public opinion polls show uncritical and growing 
support for the postition of "environmental tiber alles." For example, a 
poll by the New York Times and CBS News taken in April of 1983 
reported that 58 percent of the sample surveyed agreed with the following 
statement: 
Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and 
standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental 
improvements must be made regardless of cost.5 
Let us note that the 58 percent agreeing with that statement represents an 
increase from the 45 percent in September 1981. Also, of all the categories 
polled, the weakest support came from college graduates, of whom only 46 
percent supported the statement. 
Looking toward the future, it is also useful to observe the results of a 
survey examining whom people trust to recommend regulatory changes. In 
the case of the Clean Air Act, "environmental groups" received a positive 
74 percent and "university professors" 72 percent. "Business and 
industry" was last with 39 percent, just below the "news media" with 47 
percent.6 Perhaps, those of us in academia have been a bit too shy and have 
left the field of battle to the more organized and specialized interests. 
Assignment Three: Procedural Reform 
President Reagan's first important administrative act in the regulatory 
area was to put on hold the numerous so-called "midnight regulations" 
issued during the last month of the Carter Administration. On January 29, 
1981, President Reagan ordered the 11 major Executive Branch regulatory 
departments and agencies to postpone the effective dates of all regulations 
scheduled to take effect by March 20 and to refrain from issuing any final 
regulations until that date. In retrospect, 196 regulations were exempt from 
the freeze and became effective during the 60-day period, while 72 regula-
tions were further postponed or withdrawn. 
That was just a preliminary response to the tide of new regulations. A 
more lasting response came in February, when President Reagan signed 
Executive Order 12291 on "Federal Regulation," replacing an order 
issued by President Carter. The new policy statement created stronger 
White House oversight of regulatory activity and more stringent 
requirements for analyzing the benefits and costs of regulation.' 
Regulatory agencies under the President's jurisdiction are required to 
make their regulatory decisions according to benefit-cost and cost-
effectiveness criteria, to the extent permitted by law. 
7 
Under the new executive order, all proposed and final regulations must 
be submitted to OMB for review at least sixty days prior to publication 
in the Federal Register. OMB may ask for further information and 
consultations before a rule is published, but its concurrence is not 
required. Under E.O. 12291, regulatory agencies determine which of their 
new regulations are "major" and submit Regulatory Impact Analyses to 
OMB along with their proposals. An economic impact of $100 million a 
year is the designated threshold, with many exceptions and additions. 
The guidelines for preparing Regulatory Impact Analyses issued by 
OMB do not require a dollar estimate of all regulatory efforts, but the 
agencies are urged to identify all effects and to quantify them where 
possible. A discount rate of 10 percent is recommended for analyzing 
future costs and benefits. 
Most draft regulatory proposals pass OMB muster. For example, as of 
December 28, 1981, OMB found 2,412 of 2,715 submissions consistent 
with the executive order. Ninety-one regulations were rejected and minor 
changes were suggested in 134 cases. The remainder (78) was technically 
exempt from the order and was submitted for informational purposes. 
Of the 2,412 regulations approved by OMB, only 40 were considered 
"major." Regulatory Impact Analyses were prepared for the 19 which 
were not exempted from the requirement. 
It seems, at first blush, that the OMB review is not normally a major 
obstacle to a regulatory agency desiring to issue new rulings. However, 
we do not know what changes the agencies made prior to submitting the 
proposals to OMB to obtain or expedite clearance. Also, it would seem 
(or at least be hoped) that OMB used its judgment to concentrate on key 
regulatory issues and, thus, quickly approved minor and routine rule 
changes. One indication of its doing so is the estimates of the reduction 
in the costs of compliance. 
The momentum of regulatory growth has been 
slowed down since January 1981 
The Task Force on Regulatory Relief estimated that, as of August of 
1982, the review process had resulted in $9-$11 billion savings in one-time 
investment costs, and $6 billion in annual recurring costs. Those totals 
were described as conservative, because costs estimates were not available 
for all of the changes made. But in addition to these direct savings, the 
Administration states that it has cut 200 million hours of annual paper-
work (including regulatory and other federal requirements), or 13 percent 
of the government-mandated paperwork that existed in January of 1981.8 
Evaluation- I am ignoring the claims about the reduction in the number 
of new rules and in the number of pages in the Federal Register. Those 
numbers may be indicative of the new approach, but they remind me of the 
8 
l 
bureaucratic response to President Eisenhower's preference for one-page 
memos: smaller margins, larger paper, and finer print. Nevertheless, it 
seems clear that the momentum of regulatory growth has been slowed 
down since January 1981. 
Increasing Activity-A balanced appraisal needs to recognize that not 
all administrative actions taken since January 1981 have been aimed at 
reducing the burden of regulation. Quite a few have gone the other way, 
especially in the field of foreign trade. For example, after discussion with 
U.S. government representatives, Japan "voluntarily" agreed to limit the 
exports of automobiles to the United States to 1.68 million a year for three 
successive years. The decision was taken in the context of rising support for 
legislative proposals to establish statutory quotas on imports of cars from 
Japan. Indeed Japan recently agreed to a fourth year of quotas but at a 
slightly higher Ievel-l. 85 million units. 
In May 1982, President Reagan imposed emergency sugar import quotas 
in order to maintain the high domestic subsidy price. Also last year, he 
tightened the sanctions placed originally in 1981 on American companies 
participating in the Soviet Natural Gas Pipeline. The 1982 extension 
applied to European subsidiaries of U.S. firms and foreign firms operating 
under U.S. licensing agreements. After many complaints from domestic 
firms and foreign governments, the President lifted the pipeline sanctions 
in November 1982.9 
In October 1982, the President announced an agreement with the Euro-
pean Economic Community to limit European steel exports to the United 
States. In return, American steel companies dropped 42 complaints against 
European companies, in which they had been charged with selling subsi-
dized steel or dumping steel in the United States below actual production 
costs. The self-imposed European quotas were the alternative to our Com-
merce Department imposing duties of up to 26 percent on imports of steel 
from Western Europe. Such tariffs, however, would have represented less 
Unless the competitiveness of American industry improves 
substantially, an increase in regulation of foreign trade 
will seem to be a politically attractive alternative 
interference with the marketplace than the firm quotas that were 
established. 
Not all of the increase in regulation occurred in the foreign trade area. In 
late May 1983, for example, the Task Force on Regulatory Relief overruled 
OMB and gave the Labor Department the go-ahead to continue requiring 
engineering controls to reduce textile workers' exposure to cotton dust. 
OMB had contended that workers could be adequately protected by 
respirators and for less cost.10 
Unless the competitiveness of American industry can be improved 
9 
substantially, an increase in regulation of foreign trade seems to be the 
most politically attractive alternative. 
Assignment Four: Reducing the 
Economic Burden of Regulation 
No recent study of the total burden of federal regulation is available to 
use in an examination of the changing economic costs of regulation 
resulting from the actions of the Reagan Administration. The oft-quoted 
work of the Center for the Study of American Business was based on data 
for 1976. For a few years after that, I made rough estimates on the bold 
assumption of a constant ''multiplier'' connecting direct federal outlays 
and the resultant compliance costs. Because of the many changes made in 
the last two years in the budgets of the regulatory agencies, I would be sur-
prised if the "multiplier" were still the same as we found it in 1976. 
An indication of the changing burden of federal regulation may be 
gleaned from the budgetary data and the related estimates of federal 
regulatory personnel. On the basis of the Federal Budget submitted to 
Congress in January 1983, it appears that reductions in total regulatory 
spending made in fiscal year 1982 (a 3 percent cut) have been followed by a 
pattern of far more modest increases than those which characterized the 
decade of the 1970s. That, at least, is what the "nominal" data show. In 
''real'' terms, when the numbers are adjusted to eliminate the effect of 
inflation, a pattern is revealed of reductions in every year since 1980, 
aggregating to a 14 percent decrease in the real level of federal regulatory 
outlays over the five-year period 1980-84. Table 1 contains the highlights of 
these developments .I • 
Personnel at the major regulatory agencies also dropped considerably in 
1981 and 1982, and is estimated to fall even further through 1984 (see 
Table 2). 
Regulatory Spending Cuts-A modest $800 million was spent by the 
federal government in 1970 to administer the regulatory activities of the 42 
major agencies that were then operating. By 1975 that amount had risen by 
300 percent, to over $3 billion. By 1980 regulatory outlays had risen ever 
further, to nearly $6 billion. Total spending by the major agencies grew 
more than sixfold over these eleven years-a period during which other 
budget items such as outlays for the Defense Department and total annual 
Social Security benefit payments rose by only 74 percent and 278 percent, 
respectively. In constant dollars, adjusted for inflation, this growth was 
also dramatic; regulatory budgets grew by 274 percent in real terms from 
1970 to 1980, reaching nearly $3 billion. 
The long-term trend of rising federal outlays for regulation was reversed 
10 
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can be determined plan increases. Overall, staffing in areas of social 
regulation will decline by one sixth from 1980 to 1984. Only four social 
regulatory agencies plan modest increases-the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission; the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service in the 
Department of Agriculture; the National Labor Relations Board; and the 
Inspector for the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System. The largest 
reductions are projected for the various agricultural inspection services 
(3,600 fewer employees); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
(approximately 1,000 fewer employees); the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (a reduction in force of 660); and the Economic 
Regulatory Administration in the Department of Energy (nearly 1,900 
fewer positions). 
Economic regulation will experience total personnel cuts of roughly one 
tenth during the period 1980-1984. Only one agency, the Patent and 
Trademark Office in the Department of Commerce, will increase 
employment-by 550 employees, or 20 percent of the 1980 staffing. The 
largest personnel reduction, in percentage terms, will be made in the soon 
to be abolished Civil Aeronautics Board, where staffing will be cut in half. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission will have the largest reduction in 
force, however. It will reduce its staffing by 740 employees, or one third its 
1980 level. The Securities and Exchange Commission will reduce its 
employment by nearly one fifth. 
Efforts to reduce the size and cost of the federal 
regulatory establishment are not a substitute 
for substantive changes in statutes 
Evaluation-The Reagan Administration's efforts to reduce the size and 
costs of the federal government's regulatory establishment are not a 
substitute for making substantive changes in the statutes that empower the 
agencies or in the rules that the agencies issue. Nevertheless, cutbacks in 
budgets and personnel can have important effects, but they can lead to 
important backlash effects as well. 
However, the larger issue in this regard is the ability of regulatory agen-
cies to perform their functions in an effective manner. Merely funding and 
staffing an agency does not ensure that it will perform its functions well or 
that the intended objectives will be achieved. Likewise, cutting a regulatory 
agency's budget does not necessarily reduce the burdens it imposes on the 
private sector. In fact, some budget cuts could have the reverse effect-to 
the extent, for example, that they increase delays in issuing permits needed 
to authorize new construction. For the time being, budgetary moderation 
and a small measure of austerity characterize the activities of most federal 
regulatory agencies. 
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Summary Evaluation and Recommendations 
Actions on the regulatory reform front during the past two-and-three-
quarter years have simultaneously failed to meet the high hopes of 
regulatory reform enthusiasts and the fears of the defenders of the existing 
body of federal regulation. The regulatory system is far from the idyllic 
state where it consists solely of rulings that generate more benefits than 
costs, nor is it about to wither away. The similarities between the 
regulatory system of October 1983 and that of January 1981 are far greater 
than the differences. Yet the spokesmen of the recently-launched 
counterattack against regulatory reform provide a viewpoint that is 
very different. 
Regulatory reform during the past two-and-three-quarter years 
has simultaneously failed to meet the high hopes 
of reform enthusiasts and the fears of 
the defenders of the status quo 
It may be helpful to let the opponents of regulatory reform speak for 
themselves. That enables others to judge the relative proportions of 
analysis and emotion. Here is an excerpt of a recent article by Michael 
Pertschuk, former chairman and now member of the FTC: 
A goodly number of Mr. Reagan's regulators have now spent two 
years dismantling the very regulations that in prior incarnations 
as corporate lawyers and lobbyists they had opposed .... Their 
deregulatory plans are fueled by an admixture of free-market 
ideology and corporate sycophancy. Consumers are merely bugs on 
the windshield .12 
This attack on motives rather than on substance may ultimately improve 
the prospects for regulatory reform because it itself is a form of pollu-
tion-in this case pollution of the intellectual environment. Because Mr. 
Pertschuk and so many of his allies are attorneys, I am reminded of the old 
legal maxim: "if the law is against you, argue the facts; if the facts are 
against you, argue the law; if they are both against you, bang on the 
table." 
Surely this is not the time to rest on laurels. Only a fraction of the 
regulatory reforms envisioned at the beginning of 1981 have been 
accomplished. Most of the progress had been made in the form of ad-
ministrative changes, especially in establishing a comprehensive and fairly 
effective system for reviewing pending rulemaking. A major advance has 
been the incorporation of formal benefit-cost analysis in that review 
process. Additional improvements in administrative procedures are both 
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desirable and possible. Benefit-cost analysis, especially as it is applied to 
regulation, continues to be a mechanism that is in a developmental stage. 
It is clear, nevertheless, that the major obstacles to further substantial 
improvement in the regulatory process cannot be eliminated by Executive 
action. Those obstacles are the rigid requirements and limitations in the 
basic statutes governing regulatory activities. To remind us of funda-
mentals and perhaps also of the obvious, let us recall that every regulation 
is issued pursuant to an act of Congress. 
Recent experience shows that the fundamental shortcomings of govern-
ment regulation result more from statutory than from administrative 
deficiencies. For example, the current leadership of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration has been trying to reduce the burdens of 
its rulemaking. However, the courts have struck down specific changes on 
the grounds that the proposals were inconsistent with the statute under 
which the agency operates. 
. Many legislative enactments mandate unrealistic goals or unreasonable 
methods for social regulation and need to be revised. Such onerous regula-
tion ranges from the "zero discharge" goal of the Clean Water Act to the 
"zero risk" provision of the Delaney Amendment of the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act. A word of caution: recent experiences in the environmental 
area demonstrate the need for regulators to conform to existing statutes, 
whatever their shortcomings may be. But that experience also underscores 
the need to update statutory requirements rather than introduce arbitrary 
changes via administrative action. 
It is vital to regain the momentum 
of public support for improving the performance of 
the nation's regulatory system 
We should not underestimate the importance of improving admin-
istrative review of existing as well as proposed regulations. Nor should we 
ignore the counterpressures from those who constantly seek to enlarge the 
federal presence in economic decision making.13 Nevertheless, the present 
time is ripe for meeting those pressures head on by developing the ground-
work for a new phase of regulatory reform: the review and revision of the 
substantive laws governing the regulatory process. I say that with full 
knowledge of the danger that the ensuing debate will be reported in the 
national media mainly via sensational charges and countercharges that 
obscure the underlying issues, and possibly result in a deterioration of the 
status quo. Preparing the proper foundation of information and analysis is 
indeed a challenge to economic education -and to education generally. It 
is vital to regain the needed momentum of public support for improving 
the performance of the nation's regulatory system. 
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William Ruckelshaus, the once and present head of EPA, sounds a 
cautionary note. He contends that the current climate in Congress is not 
appropriate for considering changes in environmental legislation. The 
problem, as he puts it, is that "Congress doesn't trust the agency to do 
what it's mandated to do" and, thus, is not willing to look favorably on 
legislative changes proposed by the White House, regardless of their 
merits.' 4 Ruckelshaus' advice deserves special weight. 
Ruckelshaus' statement, as well as recent events at EPA, underscores the 
vital role of selecting appointees to regulatory agencies. The experiences of 
recent years in several administrations demonstrate the need to select 
people who take a balanced approach to the benefits and burdens of 
regulation. Appointing uncritical enthusiasts for expansion of government 
regulation inevitably produces a regulatory regime characterized by 
excessive burdens and cavalier disregard of economic impacts. Similarly, 
regulators who lack a basic sympathy toward the programs they 
administer-or who, through lack of sensitivity, project such a negative 
image - are counterproductive. As we have seen so vividly, they can set 
back the prospects for regulatory reform very substantially. 
As our Regulatory Reform Task Force urged in 1980, regulatory 
activities that are deemed worthy of continuation should be managed by 
people who are both sympathetic to the important social objectives to be 
achieved and equally concerned with minimizing the burdens they impose 
on individual citizens as taxpayers and consumers. The leadership of 
regulatory agencies - as well as of other governmental activities - must 
understand that good policymaking means a careful balancing of a variety 
of important considerations-such as clean air and high employment, 
healthier working conditions and greater productivity. 
Perhaps the most urgent need is to con vice members of Congress 
to demonstrate a sense of balance when they write 
the basic regulatory laws 
Thus, it is sad to read of the boasting of a group of ex-regulators in the 
Carter Administration that say they will use networks of civil servants at 
their former agencies to oppose the Reagan Administration's regulatory 
relief efforts. "These people will tip off the former administrators," says 
Robert Nelson, research director of the self-styled Regulatory Audit 
Group. "Yes, ... the network exists," states group member Joan 
Claybrook, former head of the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.' s Managing a regulatory agency under such circumstances 
(which approach guerilla warfare) is quite a challenge. Public under-
standing is helpful, and a stronger statutory foundation for more balanced 
regulation becomes essential. 
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Perhaps the most urgent need is to convince members of Congress to 
demonstrate a sense of balance when they write the basic regulatory laws. 
The task of updating regulatory statutes is not easy. The types of changes 
that should be made depend on the nature of exisiting regulation, the 
specific regulatory mechanisms currently in use, and the shortcomings, if 
any, in the unregulated private economy. A simple or uniform response is 
not appropriate. Each regulatory law should be examined individually and 
carefully and-despite the counterattacks by the true believers-
dispassionately. 
Professor George Steiner of UCLA, an experienced observer of 
business-government relations in the United States, has provided what may 
prove to be a realistic appraisal of what can be expected in the near term. 
The most optimistic assessment of success for the Reagan Administra-
tion's regulatory reform efforts will not spell more than a marginal 
diminution of the massive pile of present-day regulation. Nor will 
regulatory reform blunt the strong pressures for more government 
regulation of business. The best that can be hoped for is a slowing down 
of the trend of growing government regulations and a reduction in 
specific unwise, unjust, and unnecessary regulations.' 6 
The reason for Professor Steiner's relative pessimism is that he expects a 
continuation of the growth in numbers and strength of special interest 
groups. He concludes that it is unlikely that most of these groups will be 
more compromising in the future than at present.~ 7 Nevertheless, in 
contrast to the rapid growth and expansion mode of the recent past, 
federal regulatory activity has taken a more modest path in the Reagan 
Administration. 
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